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Artikel ini mencoba untuk merefleksikan pemahaman saya 
mengenai tantangan yang dihadapi oleh Naqsabandî di Turki 
dan Indonesia. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penulis 
memulai pembahasan dengan menjelaskan konsep sekularisasi 
dan bagaimana konsep itu direspons oleh masing-masing 
citizen. Di Indonesia, konsep sekularisasi berjalan secara pasif, 
sedangkan di Turki sekularisasi berjalan secara asertif. Dari sini, 
penulis menganalisis perbedaan tantangan tarekat Naqsabandî 
di masing-masing negara, bahwa di Indonesia tantangan itu 
berasal dari kelompok reformis yang banyak melakukan kritik 
terhadap tarekat atas perilaku sosialnya yang dianggap 
menyimpang (bid‘ah dan shirk). Sedangkan di Turki, tantangan 
tarekat Naqsabandî justru berasal dari institusi negara. 
Sekularisme tampak dimanfaatkan oleh penguasa untuk 
meredam gerakan tarekat Naqsabandî yang dipandang sebagai 
ancaman terhadap kekuasaan. Selain itu, sekularisme juga 
menjadikan negara ‘polisi’ peradaban setempat dengan 
menjustifikasi tarekat Naqsabandî hanya akan membawa 
masyarakat menjadi semakin terbelakang dan tidak mampu 
menghadapi tantangan modernitas. Artikel ini akan melihat 
perbedaan masing-masing tantangan ini dan bagaimana 
kelompok Naqsabandî bisa bertahan. 
Kata kunci: Tarekat Naqsabandî, Indonesia, Turki. 
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Introduction 
Al-t}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah is well known Sufi order in Turkey 
and Indonesia, and it is the biggest Sufi orders in Turkey. The Sufi Order 
(or t}arîqah) is a fraternity of individuals who follow a particular school of 
Sufism under the guidance of a shaykh (spiritual master). A Sufi order can 
be seen as an institutionalized version of the individually oriented 
practices of the early Muslim ascetics.1 The orders are typically named in 
reference to their founders, such as al-T}arîqah al-Qadarîyah referred to 
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî, al-T}arîqah al-Shâdhilîyah referred to Abû 
H{asan al-Shâdhilî, and so forth. The Sufi orders typically link their 
shaykh, through a lineage of various shaykhs, to ‘Alî, the cousin and son-
in-law of Muhammad and thus to Muh }ammad himself. One exception to 
this is the al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah, which traces the chain of their 
spiritual masters to Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammad, and 
founder of this t}arîqa was Bahaeddin Naksibend of Turkistan (b. 1490).2 
Both Turkey and Indonesia have several t}arîqas. In Indonesia, for 
example, based on their national conference established by Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) in Semarang in 1981, they determined forty-five different 
Sufi orders accepted as members of Jam‘îyah Ahl al-T}arîqah al-Mu‘tabarah 
and considered as providing a link to the Prophet Muh }ammad,3 and al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah is one of them. 
According to Dina Le Gall, al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah is one of 
the most widespread and enduring of all the Sufi orders (t}arîqah’s), and 
one of the better studied.4 Yet the presence and vitality of this t}arîqah in 
                                                          
1 Y. Alp. Aslandogan, “Present and Spiritual Impact of the Spiritual Tradition of Islam 
on Contemporary Muslims: From Ghazali to Gulen”, dalam Ihsan Yilmaz (ed.), Muslim 
world in Transition: Contribution of the Gulen Movement: Conference Procidings (London: School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 2007), 666. 
2 Hakan M. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 135. 
3 Zamakhshari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiyai (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 1985), 143. 
4 Dina Le Gall, “Forgotten Naqshabandis and the Culture of Pre-Modern Sufi 
Brotherhoods”, dalam Studia Islamica, No. 97, (2003), 87. 
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the Ottoman world in the two centuries or so prior to the coming of the 
first Naqshbandi Mujaddidis from India around 1700 has been unduly 
neglected. Meanwhile al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah came to Indonesia in 
the 17th century which has closely related to the Mecca as the center of 
Indonesian Naqsabandî. Shaykh Yûsuf Makassarî (1626-1699) was 
initially as the first disseminator of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in 
Indonesia.5 Then in the early 1850s, Shaykh Ismâ‘îl Minangkabawî had 
successfully made this order as a strong religious organization socially.6 
Seeing at the Turkish history, it is an important fact that al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah played significant social and political roles ranging from 
artistic and architectural influences and sustaining the educational 
system, to provide healing spaces and social networks of support for the 
poor and the marginal, to direct involvement in the structures of 
power.7In Indonesia, al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah played social role as well 
as political role. It means that no study on Islamic society, and 
particularly that of Indonesia, ought to ignore Naqsabandî’s t}arîqah roles 
in social and politics. The al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah, binding together 
individuals with a supernatural bond, was themselves a social power. It 
came to be associated in various ways with different strata of society. It 
was religious organization for mutual help, and a venerated shaykh could 
voice the people’s grievances and condemn tyranny and oppression. It 
assisted the poor, and ministered to the sick and travelers. But in fact, in 
actualizing their roles, al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah faced many challenges. 
Based on this fact, this paper aims to highlight the different challenges 
faced by al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Turkey and Indonesia related to 
the process of secularization in both two countries. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naksyabandiyah di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 98; 
Sri Mulyati et.al., Mengenal dan Memahami Tarikat-tarikat Muktabarah di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Prenada Media, 2005), 95. 
6 Bruinessen, Tarekat Naksyabandiyah, 98. 
7 Sadeq Rahimi, “Intimate Exteriority: Sufi Spaces as Sanctuary from Injured 
Subjectivities in Turkey”, dalam Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 46, No. 3, (2007), 410. 
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Turkey’s and Indonesia’s Secularization 
Before discussing the challenges of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in 
Turkey and Indonesia, it is helpful to start with a broad overview of 
Turkey’s and Indonesia’s secularization that have shaped the context of 
the challenges of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah. Both Turkey and Indonesia 
have different characteristics of secularization, but the issues of the 
secularization project are almost similar which is related to positioning 
the state-religion relations. The secularization in Turkey can be 
considered as assertive secularism; whereas in Indonesia the 
secularization can be called as passive secularism providing Pancasila as 
the basis of state.8 
Ihsan Yilmaz explained the differences between passive and 
assertive secularism by adopting the view from Ahmet T. Kuru.9 He 
stated that in passive secularism, the secular state plays a ‘passive’ role 
and while avoiding the establishment of any religions, it “allows for the 
public visibility of religion”.10 On the other hand, in assertive secularism, 
the state tries to exclude religion from the public sphere in addition to 
playing an ‘assertive’ role as “the agent of a social engineering project 
that confines religion to the private domain”.11Because of different 
secularization projects in Turkey and Indonesia, it is clear the presence 
of different challenges faced by al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah. Concerning 
to the state-religion relations, for example in Indonesia context, by 
passive secularization the state has obligatory public holidays for the 
                                                          
8 Abdillah Masykuri, “Ways of Constitution Building in Muslim Countries: The Case of 
Indonesia”, dalam Birgit Krawietz & Helmut Reifeld (eds.), Islam and the Rule of Law: 
Between Shariah and Secularization (Germany: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008), 5. 
9 Shantikumar Hettiarachchi, “Turkish Muslims and Islamic Turkey: Perspectives for a 
New European Islamic Identity”, dalam Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz (eds.), European 
Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives On and from the Güllen Movement (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2012), 43. 
10 Ahmet T. Kuru, “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological 
Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion”, dalam World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3, 
(2007), 571. 
11 Ibid. 
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majority Muslims as well as minority faiths. The state also recognizes six 
official religions, and accepts the presence of religion in public life and 
promotes the belief in God. In brief, it can be said that the state gives 
religious freedom to practice religious teachings in public spheres, 
including spiritual practices. On the other hand, in the context of 
assertive secularization in Turkey, the state campaign against traditional 
Islamic institutions, Sufi orders being one the chief targets.12 As the 
result, the state banned all Sufi orders in 1925, including al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah. 
 
The Different Challenges between al-T }arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in 
Turkey and Indonesia 
Generally speaking, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century we saw the Sufi orders were attacked on all sides, but it was not 
this which made the difference from the past time. Attackers had never 
been wanting; their beliefs had been refuted, their practices condemned, 
their dervishes ridiculed and occasionally executed, and their shaykhs 
castigated. None of this abated their popularity to the slightest degree. 
What we have seen in our time has been a process of erosion set in 
motion through the twentieth-century spread of secularization, with 
consequent changes in the social order and the infiltration of secularist 
ideas. This process of change has so undermined the Sufi orders that in 
many parts of the Arab world in particular and other Islamic countries in 
general, they have declined.13 
Sociologically speaking, at the time, we have seen religion 
declined and displaced, or reduced from being the regulative principle 
behind life which should be sustaining and molding society, to become 
one among many aspects of social life, though receiving special 
recognition as a factor of differentiation within the universalism of 
secular culture. At the same time, Islam continues to be the guiding 
principle in the personal lives of vast numbers of people, and within 
                                                          
12 Yavuz, Islamic Political, 139. 
13 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 246. 
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Islam the Sufi tradition will continue to fulfill its mission of maintaining 
the deeper spiritual values through the special linkage and relationship 
with the spiritual world that the t}arîqah represents.14 In the case of al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah, the presence of different kind of secularization 
between Turkey and Indonesia led Naqsabandî’s shaykhs to respond the 
new challenges with different ways. 
1. Naqsabandî’s Challenges in Indonesia 
Naqsabandî t}arîqa in Indonesia faced challenges and attacks from 
Muslim reformers graduated from Mecca. The first challenge is critics 
came from Sâlim bin Samîr and Sayyid Uthmân. At the first time, 
actually they did not criticize t}arîqah as religious institutional but they 
criticized the shaykhs personally, because they claimed shaykhs as pseudo-
Sufis. In 1852 Ibn Sâmir’s writings were focused to attack and criticize 
Ismail Minangkabawi personally. On the other hand, Sayyid Uthmân 
showed his angry to Naqsabandî’s shaykhs who had deep influence in 
Mecca, Sulaymân Zuhdî. He asserted that his critics to tasawwuf and 
t}arîqah because the shaykhs made people backward and failed to face the 
challenges from modernity.  
After Muslim reformers criticized on Naqsabandî’s shaykhs, they 
continued to criticize the teachings of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah. They 
stated that Naqsabandî’s teachings and practices were lead people to 
practice bid’ah (innovation) and shirk (polytheism). These critics came 
from Ahmad Khatib (1852-1915), he was famous ‘ulamâ’ (Muslim 
scholars) who stayed in Mecca and he also was well known because of 
his critics to adat law considered as matrilineal. In 1906-1908, he 
successfully wrote three books to criticize al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah.  
Then his critics were answered apologetically by Naqsabandî’s shaykhs 
such as Muh }ammad Sa‘d bin T{ant}a’ and his student, Khât}ib ‘Alî. They 
tried to prove that Naqabandî’s rituals have the basis from al-Qur’an and 
Hadith. The effect of debates was not limited among Minangkabawî 
people but it affected to all regions in Indonesia. Another critic on al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah came from Ah }mad Khâtib’s student, Haji Rasul 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 258. 
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or ‘Abd al-Karîm bin Muh }ammad Amr Allâh. He is Hamka’s father. He 
wrote two risalah (articles) to criticize al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah and 
Khât}ib ‘Alî. The debates continued until the early 1981 because 
Nakhabandi’s shaykhs also wrote some books and articles to answer 
their critics. One of the latest books was written by Haji Yahya bin 
Laksemana with the title Lisan Naqsabandîyah.  
Beside critics from Muslim reformers, Naqsabandî t}arîqa also 
faced some critics from Islamic organizations such as al-Irsyad (1913) 
and Muhammadiyah (1912).  They criticized that al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah to be specific and other t}arîqaHs in general led Muslims to 
innovation (bid‘ah), superstition (khurafat) and imagination (takh}ayyul). 
Perhaps Muhammadiyah is the most active organization attacking Sufi 
t}arîqas. 
The critics from Muslim reformers and “puritanists” Islamic 
organizations led Naqsabandî’s shaykhs and other shaykhs from other 
t}arîqahs to join traditionalist Islamic organization such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama (1926) in Java and PERTI (1928) in Minangkabau. They joined 
the organization to respond Muslim reformers’ critics. Shaykh Jalâl al-
Dîn, a khalîfa of Shaykh ‘Alî Rid}â of Jabal Abû Qubays claimed that the 
PPTI had been established as early as 1920, and that the initials then 
stood for Persatuan Pembela Thariqat Islam (Union of Defenders of the 
Islamic T}arîqah). This organization seems to be attached to the 
Naqshbandi t}arîqa and in the first Indonesian elections in 1955, a 
Sumatran Naqshbandi was elected to the national parliament as the sole 
representative of the t}arîqa political party.  
2. Naqsabandî’s Challenges in Turkey 
The most challenges of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Turkey 
came from the state. It is totally different with the challenges of al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Indonesia. This is because the secularization 
projects in Turkey led the state to control religion in public spheres. As 
one of its consequences, in 1925 the state banned all Sufi orders, 
including al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah which was the biggest Sufi orders in 
Turkey. At the time there were between 1,000 and 2,000 lodges in the 
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core of provinces of Anatolia and Rumelia (the Balkans).  Especially in 
the capital of Istanbul, there were 305 Sufi lodges, 65 of which were 
Naqsabandî.  
Brian Silverstein stated that in the Ottoman Empire until 1923 
and briefly in the Republic of Turkey, Sufi orders were of major 
importance to social, political and economic life. But after the 
secularization, in 1925 the Republican administration proscribed the 
orders and closed their lodges. It has since been technically a punishable 
offence to be involved in a Sufi order – as shaykh (a title not recognized 
by the Turkish state) or as devotee – although a number of orders have 
continued to function in a somewhat ‘public secret’ fashion.  Under 
Legal Code 677, the Republic closed Sufi lodges on November 30, 1925, 
later replacing them with the Halkevleri, or People’s Houses, which 
promoted radical secularization and obedience to the new state elite.  
The most interesting question is why the state banned and closed 
Sufi orders. It seems that the Father of Turk, Mustafa Kemal wanted to 
modernize the country, to release it from the hold of what he felt were 
backward religious ideas. Annemarie Schimmel, one of the foremost 
scholars of Turkish mystical literature, agrees in part with Kemal's 
assessment of the majority of the Muslim fraternities (t}arîqahs) at that 
time, namely that it was very difficult for these institutions to respond to 
modernizing influences in the early twentieth century.  Furthermore, she 
explained that 
[at the same time,] . . . the institutions found themselves unable to 
respond to the need for modernization and changed outlook. 
Instead of fulfilling their centuries-old function as centers of 
spiritual education, they became headquarters of obscurantism 
and backwardness. That is why Ataturk abolished the orders in 
1925 - a step that some of the leading personalities in the mystical 
hierarchy even approved of. They felt that the spiritual values of 
Sufism as taught by the poets of Anatolia would survive without 
the ruined framework of the orders - and perhaps in a more 
genuine way. And these values are, indeed, still alive.  
At the same time, what Ataturk did not understand fully was that 
although the orders may have been backward and corrupted; their 
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abolition would not eradicate the Islamic values and practices on which 
they were founded. However, Schimmel’s statement that the values of 
the Muslim and Sufi teachers would not die with the abolition of the 
institutions has proven true. During the years of one-party rule in 
Turkey, religious sentiments and practices remained quiet and separate 
from the public sphere of politics.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on above comparison, I try to reflect my understanding 
related the challenges faced by al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Turkey and 
Indonesia. Firstly, In Turkey, where the secularizing movement of 
Mustafa Kamal brought about their prohibition in 1925, is an example of 
what has been taking place less spectacularly in other countries through 
the process of secularization; changes in the outlook and in the social 
order undermining confidence in former religious ways. So, al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah was banned because they were politically dangerous, and it 
claimed to led Muslims into backwardness and did not able to respond 
to the modernity. On the contrary, in Indonesia these days we observe 
some prominent figures have shown their interest in Sufism on one 
hand, but certain Muslim reformers such as Salim ibn Samir, Sayyid 
Usman, Ahmad Khatib, and Haji Rasul criticized al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah and claimed that it led Muslims to innovation (bid‘ah) and 
polytheism (shirk). In the similar way, “puritanists” organizations such as 
al-Irsyad and Muhammadiyah also criticized al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah 
and claimed that this t}arîqah led Muslims to practice several things 
considered as innovation (bid‘ah), superstition (khurafat) and imagination 
(takh }ayyul). From this explanation, it can be said that the rival of al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Turkey is the state; whereas the rival of al-
T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in Indonesia is Muslim reformer or puritan’s 
organization.  
Secondly, in Indonesia, al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah and other Sufi 
t}arîqahs are religious organizations which deeply concern to spiritual life. 
The social significance of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah was many sided but 
the religious significance was primary. It cannot be denied that to some 
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extent al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah was fully blended with the saint-cult 
and living saints: exploiting it, in fact, represented the religion of the 
ordinary people. While in Turkey, the al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah, became 
a significant element in establishing nation identity and became state’s 
opposition. We find leaders of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah aspiring to 
political power, and revolting against established authority. For example, 
Resat Halli mentions that between 1924 and 1938, there were 18 
rebellions against the draconian policies of the state, and most were led 
by the al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah.15 In Indonesian history, especially in 
the nineteenth century the Sufi orders were in the forefront of Muslim 
reaction against the expansion of colonialist powers. For example, al-
T}arîqah al-Sammâinîyah actively opposed the Dutch in Palembang in 1819 
and in South Kalimantan in 1860.  Al-T}arîqah al-Qadirîyah wa al-
Naqsabandîyah took part in the peasant’s revolt of Banten in 1888 and in 
1891 in Lombok against Hindu oppression in Bali.16In West Sumatra, 
where there is also a strong Naqsabandî presence, strong resistance was 
shown in 1908 to Dutch presence by the Sattârîyah order. In addition, the 
Sanûsîyah in the late nineteenth century inspired the Achehnese war 
against the Dutch while its shaykh in Libya was fighting against Italian 
incursions there from 1914 to 1918. 
Thirdly, in the context of Turkye’s secularization, building nation-
state is more important, while in Indonesian context, purifying religion is 
more important. Thus, reformer Muslims attacked Naqsabandî t}arîqa, in 
order to purify religion. Fourthly, although al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah or 
other t}arîqahs suspected as the cause of Muslim backward, but it still has 
important roles in social and politics. In social life, al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah can be regarded as Muslim identity which offers spiritual 
values. In politics, Naqsabandî t}arîqah and other t}arîqahs can be 
functioned as political vehicle, to get voice in public election for 
example. It is because they have strong bonding relationship among 
t}arîqahs followers with their shaykh. 
                                                          
15 Yavuz, Islamic Political, 139. 
16 Bruinessen, “The Origins and Development”, 29-31. 
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Since the nineteenth century, the general trend in the Muslim 
world was trying to rationalize or secularize many aspects of human life 
and develop their nation. The different of secularization projects in 
Turkey and Indonesia caused the different challenges faced by al-T}arîqah 
al-Naqsabandîyah. In Turkey, before the secularization occurred, al-T}arîqah 
al-Naqsabandîyah played significant roles in society, but in 1925 the state 
banned all Sufi orders. While in Indonesia, at the time, al-T}arîqah al-
Naqsabandîyah faced the critics from reformer Muslims and Puritans 
Islamic organization. The main challenge of al-T}arîqah al-Naqsabandîyah in 
Turkey was closely related to the state’s efforts to control religion; 
whereas in Indonesia the main challenge was concerned to purify Islamic 
teachings from bid‘ah (innovation) and shirk (polytheism). 
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